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2003, sixteen of them (forty percent) faced challenges to their remaining in office for their full terms, and nine (twenty-three percent) of their "fixed" terms ended early (see Table 1 ). Presidents in Ecuador and Bolivia have also fallen since 2003, and President Chavez in Venezuela has narrowly survived challenges to his government. Given these developments, it is obvious that South American presidents can not assume they will hold a given and fixed term of office.
The term "presidential fall" is used here to identify all the times elected presidents left office before their terms were completed, whether they resigned or were impeached or otherwise forced out of office. "Challenges" involve concrete action to convince the president to resign or to force him out early. The various challenges and falls are consid ered together on the theoretical ground that they are all equally deviations from the expected fixed term of presidentialism. Consequently, the focus is on challenges to presidents from civilian actors, in the leg islature or in civil society. Many studies of presidential falls in South America have focused on elite negotiations that bring down presidents in one country, treating street protests as background pressure on elites.5 Others, however, give central place to the role of mass protest in a specific presidential fall.6 While these articles provide valuable information about the unfolding of crisis moments, the study of presidential falls needs to be advanced in two ways in order to understand the general phenomenon in South America and perhaps beyond.
First, all of these studies suffer from the methodological error of selecting on the dependent variable from the standpoint of understanding the causes of presidential falls.
They select cases because the presidents fell and lack corresponding cases where presi dents remain in office whole terms despite efforts to throw them out. This article uses a tool from studies of social movements, protest event analysis, to correct this method ological problem. Protest event analysis uses media sources to document the occurrence of unconventional forms of collective action as a first step in assessing the causes or consequences of that action.7 This technique is used to document all of the sixteen times since 1978 that South American mass publics or congressional elites have moved to demand early ends to presidential terms (see Table 2 ). Most of the failed efforts are largely forgotten since they did not succeed, but they are as crucial in understanding presidential falls as the successful ones. There are three inductively identified reasons for challenges: the president's neoliberal economic policies, his personal involvement in scandal, and his minority status. In all forty presidencies, each of these is a risk factor for presidents who want to complete their terms, as challenged and fallen presidents dis proportionately shared these characteristics compared to the full set of presidents.
Second, the presence or absence of street protests is central for the challenge out comes. While both political elites and mass publics have tried to remove presidents early, all successful mobilizations for presidential falls have included civil society actors demanding in the streets that presidents go.8 As Table 2 shows with its empty quadrant, all five efforts to remove presidents that took place exclusively in the legislature failed.
These observations suggest that street protest is decisive at least in the final stages of presidential falls. Street protests by civil society actors, with or without parallel legisla tive action, appear to be the poder moderador (moderating power) of the new civilian regimes. They mark a reversal of earlier patterns, when the military played this role in the region, with its interventions often triggered by mass street protests. between presidential and multiparty systems.35 Nevertheless, it is not the only factor, as some majority presidents were challenged, and many minority presidents were not. The only two countries that had no challenges to presidents, Uruguay and Chile, also had no majority presidents.
Summary Neoliberal economic policies, personal corruption, and minority status all represent risk factors for South American presidents who want to complete their terms in office. Table 3 summarizes the predicted probabilities resulting from a logit model of the dependent variables, challenge and presidential fall, which were calculated using CLARIFY36 Table 3 reports first differences in predicted probability on the dependent variables, which are calculated by varying the variables of interest from zero to one while holding the other independent variables at their modal values. The modal presi dent in the region during these years was a minority president who followed neoliberal economic policies and was not personally implicated in scandal. Such a president faced a 38.6 percent predicted probability of being challenged and a 16.5 percent predicted probability of falling.37 Presidents with a legislative majority or who did not follow neoliberal policies could count on a small reduction in their risk of being challenged.
For presidents personally implicated in scandal, in contrast, the predicted probability of facing a challenge jumped to 63 percent (38.6 plus 24.4). Scandal also greatly increased the predicted probability that a president would actually fall early, with the probability climbing to 48.4 percent (16.5 plus 31.9). The other independent variables vary in the predicted direction but do not have a large impact on the predicted probability of falls.
From Challenge to Fall: The Roles of Street Protest
As Table 2 indicates, the presence of a mobilized population demanding in the streets that the president leave appears to be a crucial determinant of the success of challenges.
Legislators acting on their own were unable or unwilling to remove presidents. Street protest accompanied legislative action and, increasingly, was a phenomenon on its own in presidential falls. Overall, the evidence on presidential falls supports the arguments that at least in South America presidentialism is a political system with special vulnerabilities. However, they are not necessarily quite like those identified to date. Not only do the dual democratic legitimacies of presidents and legislatures push them toward competi tion, but because of the unanticipated capacity of publics to withdraw their mandates from presidents, the public remains an active player in the development of presidencies.6' It can be a crucial support to either side in the ongoing struggles between executives and legislatures and deserves further study as such. Moreover, the forty percent of South American presidents who were challenged by legislatures or protest movements and the twenty-three percent who were forced out of office early 
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